Kant is the innovator of "the synthetic a Priori proposition" and this has a principal status in his philosophy.Firstly, in this paper, the propositions are divided into "synthetic and analytic", and "a Priori and a posteriori; and our purpose is to understand Kant's viewpoint over this issue.Then, the concept of "a Priori" will be investigated from Kant's viewpoint. The result of this study is that: the synthetic a Priori proposition is the synonym to a proposition which is universal, necessary and not derived from experience.Then, the procedure that Kant adopts for attainment of knowledge, or of synthetic a Priori proposition will be discussed.Finally, the question which was posed in the title of the present paper will find the answer that the procedure that Kant presents for attainment of knowledge is unable to produce synthetic a Priori propositions, because this procedure has necessarily a part that has been obtained from experience.

Undoubtedly, A Priori needs to be clarified if we are to understand the heart of Critique of Pure Reason; and Kant, precisely for this very reason, devoted a considerable part of Critique to explaining the epistemic status of A Priori, searching its origin, specifying its validity scope, and illustrating its instances. Although he, more or less, in both editions of Critique, put forward some characteristics intrinsic to A Priori (such as necessary, strictly universal, pure, clear, certain and independent of experience) since they have been also used in (pre)post-Kantian traditions, especially in a meaning different from what Kant meant, so they may simply bring about some confusions cause failing to appropriately grasp the heart of Critique. With reference to such confusions the authors make an attempt to shed light on this point in part (1). Then, in part (2-1), based on the text of Critique and its commentators’ views, authors proceed to show that to evade such confusions one should re-define necessary to “ what is emerged from the nature of the human mind” , strictly universal to “ applicable just in the realm of phenomenon” , pure to “ merely focused on the contribution of mind itself in collaboration with the objects themselves to form empirical knowledge” , clear to “ what the scope of searching for is limited to within ourselves not outside of it” and certain to “ what its scope is immutable – either regarding to its instances themselves or to their numbers” . In part (2-2), by scrutinizing the other characteristic (i. e. independent of experience), we shall show that this characteristic, besides of referring to mere structure, can refer to some kind of knowledge on which every possible experience is based; moreover, we shall determine the relation of above characteristic to pre(post)-Kantian traditions.

IntroductionThe Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly Principle (4), puts the emphasis on upholding Islamic standards in all legal norms. However, a Priori sharia Supervision over parliamentary approvals shall be exercised by the faqihs (Islamic jurists) of the Guardian Council concerning the specific laws outlined in Principles (94), (95), and (96) of the Constitution. Other approvals, notably the regulations specified in Principle (4), lack constitutional provision. To ensure optimal implementation of Principle (4), there is a need for an effective mechanism that can guarantee adherence to Sharia standards in regulations. The current Sharia-based Supervision mechanism is executed through the Court of Administrative Justice, but this approach has several shortcomings. First, it does not ensure Sharia compliance for all regulations since it is not comprehensive, only addressing the contested aspect of regulations. Moreover, regulations may possess significant importance based on inclusion, hierarchy of legal norms, authority level, and their impact on citizens’ rights and duties, leading to prolonged violations of citizens’ rights even when there are no complaints. In this respect, the present research aimed to examine the feasibility of establishing a mechanism for a Priori Sharia Supervision over key regulations, addressing the challenges associated with its implementation. The study is based on the hypothesis that there are factors favoring  a Priori Sharia Supervision over other types of monitoring when it comes to some aspects of regulations. Although most challenges are manageable, certain challenges make it both desirable and achievable to implement such a mechanism. Literature ReviewThe literature has offered solutions, suggesting the mandatory submission of government regulations and approvals from the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution to the Guardian Council before their implementation—which can ensure Supervision over regulations from both a Sharia and constitutional perspective (e.g., Amjadian, 2012; Haji Ali Khamseh et al., 2021). Another proposed solution involves the establishment of boards specialized in Islamic jurisprudence and legal matters, overseen by the Guardian Council faqihs tasked with proactive monitoring subsequent to the enactment of regulations (Fe’li, 2020). The novelty of the present study lies in its detailed analysis of the feasibility and challenges associated with a Priori Sharia Supervision over regulations. Materials and MethodsThe study relied on a descriptive–analytical method, using library research to collect and analyze the data. Results and DiscussionA Priori Sharia Supervision over regulations can viably be applied after the regulations are approved and before they take effect—similar to the Supervision over Majlis approvals. A Priori Sharia Supervision is more aligned with the objective of Principle (4) of the Constitution, so it is favored over other forms of Supervision, especially retrospective Supervision. Furthermore, it is essential that Sharia-based Supervision be applied in advance or a Priori to the implementation, at least for critical regulations that are not subject to appeal in the Court of Administrative Justice. Moreover, for the sake of legal security of citizens and the prevention of rights violations, a Priori Supervision is preferable over alternative types of monitoring because it is difficult to claim and restore the rights of citizens that might have been infringed upon in the past, especially if regulations are retroactively annulled long after their implementation. ConclusionThe challenges related to the principles of continuity and acceleration in delivering public services do not pose a significant obstacle to a Priori Sharia Supervision because it is feasible to set a deadline for expressing opinions and the Guardian Council faqihs have opinions aimed at guaranteeing these principles. Furthermore, certain regulations that are not allowed to be delayed in their approval and implementation can exceptionally be subjected to Sharia Supervision outside a Priori Sharia Supervision mechanism. It is plausible that the structure and organization of the Guardian Council may not be entirely conducive or equipped to implement such a mechanism, given the unique responsibilities of the faqihs. However, it can be limited to a Priori Sharia Supervision of critical regulations, and it is not challenging as such, given the reforms aimed at reducing the Court of Administrative Justice’s inquiries from the Council (e.g., the ability to refer to the procedure of the Council’s faqihs in similar cases), and a comprehensive revision of the Council’s organization to lay the ground for a Priori Sharia Supervision. Additionally, the Head of the Judiciary and the President of the Court can notify the Guardian Council faqihs of cases conflicting with Sharia in order to eliminate the structural defects of the Guardian Council that render it incompatible with supervising important regulations. It is worth noting that Note (1) of Article (87) of the Law of the Court of Administrative Justice (1402/2023) also lays the groundwork for establishing a suitable structure for Sharia Supervision over regulations.

This article lays the groundwork for a defense of rational intuitions by first arguing against a prevalent view according to which intuition is a distinctive psychological state, an “ intellectual seeming” that p, that then constitutes evidence that p. An alternative account is then offered, according to which an intuition that p constitutes non-inferential a Priori knowledge that p in virtue of the concepts exercised in judging that p. This account of rational intuition as the exercise of conceptual capacities in a Priori judgment is then distinguished from the dogmatic, entitlement and reliabilist accounts of intuition’ s justificatory force. The article concludes by considering three implications of the proposed view for the Experimental Philosophy movement.

In a Priori knowledge we find out not only subject - predicate relationship, but we also discover the necessity of the predication and this is one of the most significant differences between a Priori and a posteriori knowledge Kant has taken metaphysical, physical and mathematical propositions as a Priori, basically due to the necessity they involve and as to the source of discovering necessity, he presented intuition. This paper deals with different 4 interpretations of a Priori knowledge at first, then advances Kripke’s criticisms concerning the concomitance between necessity and aPriori knowledge. Then in continue lays stress on this point that as a Priori knowledge cannot resort to the experience, likewise it cannot violate a Priori knowledge.

According to one view all of a Priori propositions are necessary (and vice versa). Some of contemporary philosophers have reconsidered this view which holds that "a Priori" and "necessary" are extensionally equivalent. Considering the literature of the present issue, I believe we can recognise two distinct approaches; the definitional and the intuitional approach. The aim of this paper is to consider the first approach during the following stages: a) some of the most important definitions which has been recently introduced for "aPriori" will be investigated, b) their common element, namely the concept of "independency to sense experience" will be analysed and c) the consequences of this definitions about the relation between" a Priori" and "necessary" shall be explained. Finally, I shall conclude that most of these definitions are inconsistent to that traditional view.

Despite all the disagreements about the definition of A Priori knowledge, all philosophers seem to agree on the major role "experience" plays in its difference with A posteriori knowledge, and the idea that the degree of this role in the justification of knowledge is the basis for such a division.Obviously, to determine the limits of experience is essential for explaining such distinction. There is also a question to be answered as to whether it is possible to have both a Priori and a posteriori knowledge of one proposition.In other words, whether being a Priori or a posteriori is rooted in the proposition itself, or external elements determine the suitable source of justification? It is held by most of the contemporary epistemologists that there is no contradiction involved in having both a Priori and a posteriori knowledge of one proposition.The author in this article tries to first explain the meaning of experience, and secondly, to argue that the root of the distinction between the two types of knowledge is in the propositions themselves, and it is impossible to have both kinds of knowledge of one proposition.

Rodolph Carnap rejects any kind of synthetic knowledge and his main reason in doing so is that any kind of understanding of a Priori theory of synthetic sense on the basis of experimental researchabillity and verification is impossible. According to this approach any theorem which can not be subjected to experimental verification is indeed a nonsense pseudo theorem and hence is void of sense. This kind of theorem despite the fact that apparently explains a problem, but indeed it is a pseudo-proposition which usually comes about as a result of ambiguities which are inherent in a natural language. Yet it should be known that the application of logical analysis of language to these theorems reveals that actually there was no problem in the first place, and therefore the fallacy of these kinds of theorems becomes clear. Despite the fact that Carnap is of the idea that mathematical laws enjoy a necessary truth and therefore do not belong to the domain of generalization of experimental ordinances, yet he does not believe that they are capable of negating experimentalism. This is because, he further observes that, these types of laws are analytic and their truth or the lack of it can only be known by clarifying the underlying senses of the constituent terms of those ordinances.The fundamental truths of logic which from the criterion for analysis are based on the definitions of inplicatures of their constituent terms and words. Carnap’s theory regarding the rejection of a Priori synthetic law is based on the principle of experimental verification and the distinction between the analytic and synthetic canons. The principle of experimental verification has been strongly refuted and it only survives nominally in the study of the history of philosophy. Carnap utilizing the method of logical analysis of language has not succeeded to prove the nonsensical nature of some of the outstanding metaphysical systems, and the examples of metaphysics taken up and analyzed by him have been mainly borrowed from the works of Hegel and Heidegger. Therefore, it could be claimed that, in a sense, his criticism is indeed directed to the German idealist philosophy.

This article seeks to explain the epistemological and ontological aspects of a Priori. This concept plays a role in the thought of Kant as the consistency of essential and epistemological terms. And in Heidegger's and Gadamer's thoughts, it is present in other way. This article seeks to explain that the epistemological and ontological aspects of the former are reflected in Heidegger and Gadamer's thoughts. Kant uses it in the epistemological context, Heidegger in the ontological field, and Gadamer place on the combination of these two epistemological and ontological views. In short, a Priori in Kant's epistemology is an integral part of the mind and is necessary for the realization of the reality and experience. In Heidegger's ontology, a Priori is the former perception of being that the foundation of knowledge is in the realm of experience, and in Gadamer's thought, a Priori is a rational necessity that the history of the individual and its belonging to the tradition and society are its ontological nature.